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Abstract: Cost-benefit analysis has long been used in decision making about public health and security. Frequently, risk and 
uncertainty are involved, and benefit and cost are not evenly shared by all stakeholders in the activities where public welfare is 
concerned. The result of cost-benefit analysis may be controversial because it does not consider the conflict of interest among the 
stakeholders. In this paper, we propose a decision support approach that allows individual agents to make their own evaluations of 
benefit, cost and risk over available alternatives. Individual beliefs with respect to the alternatives will then be aggregated to form 
a group decision. This approach can also be used to integrate the cost benefit analysis into risk assessment. An application to this 
group decision making, considering the disposal of dead animals, is given. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was originally used to evaluate the 
desirability of governmental intervention in markets, and has 
now been used in many areas of public decision making such as 
transportation, environment, health care, and safety. As an 
economic approach, it shows the monetary values of benefit and 
cost of the targeted activity. This analysis is required in many 
decision making processes. 
However, the role of CBA in decision making is 
controversial when public welfare is concerned, especially 
when risk and uncertainty are involved. Most researchers and 
regulators agree that CBA is neither sufficient nor necessary for 
the final decisions because of its weaknesses [1, 2]. Firstly, in 
most cases where public welfare is concerned, benefit and cost 
are not evenly shared by all stakeholders. The stakeholders that 
pay for the expenditures or bear the risk may not necessarily 
receive sufficient benefit from the activity. CBA does not take 
into account conflict of interest among stakeholders. Secondly, 
not all the important factors in decision making can be 
quantified and CBA cannot deal with this uncertainty. Thirdly, 
economic payoff is not the primary objective in many 
circumstances, especially when there is a risk of hazard. 
Therefore, there are still challenges in order to integrate the 
result of CBA into the framework of risk assessment. 
In practice, there is discussion, negotiation, and concession 
between decision maker and stakeholders, especially when the 
consequences are potentially serious. For example, a regulatory 
decision on the disposal of nuclear waste might involve the 
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regulatory committee, the operators, the regulation advisors, 
scientists, government policy makers, etc. There would be 
lengthy discussions before a final decision could be made. No 
single agent has the power to make the final decision. It is 
actually a group decision and each stakeholder has his/her 
influence on it. 
In this paper, we propose a new decision support approach 
that integrates evidence support logic and expected utility 
theory. With this approach, the agents involved in a group 
decision making process are allowed to express their utilities or 
evaluations over different alternatives. These utilities, or 
monetary values, are translated into individual beliefs with 
respect to the comparison of alternatives with respect to each 
other. The group decision will then be given by aggregating 
individual beliefs. The group decision shows how much each 
alternative is preferred. 
II. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE 
A. Evidence support logic  
Evidence support logic (ESL) is an information propagation 
approach developed from interval probability theory [3, 4, 5]. It 
has been applied in several fields of risk regulation [7, 8]. ESL 
deals with multiple pieces of evidence from different sources 
that may overlap or conflict with one another, and it allows a 
degree of uncertainty in evidence.  
A belief is expressed by a triple (p, u, q) where p and q 
denote the probabilities that some evidence supports or refutes a 
proposition and u is the residual uncertainty. There is always 
1=++ uqp , 1,0 ≤≤ qp , and 11 ≤≤− u . 1=u  
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denotes the state of absolute ignorance and 0<u  means that 
there is possible conflict within the evidence. 
ESL has an simple algorithm to aggregate multiple beliefs 
(or evidence). Suppose that n  beliefs about the same 
proposition are expressed as ) , ,( iii qup , ni ,,1…= . Each 
belief is given a value to denote its sufficiency or how much 
weight it contributes to the proposition. The sufficiency of a 
belief takes a value range from 0 to 1. A greater sufficiency will 
result in evidence values being more influential in the 
aggregation. 
Let ( AAA qup  , , ) denote the aggregated belief. It can be 
computed as follows. 
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The computation of Aq  is similar to (1). 
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once we have the values of Ap  and Aq . Specially, when 
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B. Expected utility theory 
Expected utility theory is an approach to deal with the 
problem of decision making under risk and uncertainty in 
economics [9,10]. As a quantitative approach, it also has 
application in regulatory decision making [11]. The axiomatic 
hypothesis of expected utility is that the decision maker knows 
the probabilities of all outcomes of the activities. 
Suppose an activity may lead to several possible outcomes 
and each outcome can be expressed as a monetary value. 
Assume the decision maker has a complete, reflexive, transitive, 
and continuous evaluation over these monetary outcomes, or in 
other words, he/she possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function. Let x be an outcome and let X be the set of 
possible outcomes. Let p be a simple probability measure on X, 
thus ))(,),(),(( 21 nxpxpxpp "=  where )( ixp  are 
probabilities of outcome Xxi ∈  ( ni ,,1"= ) occurring. 
Note that there are finite elements Xx ∈  for which )(xp 0> , 
and that )( ixp 0≥  for all ni ,,1"=  and 1)(1 =∑ =ni ixp . 
The expected utility over the set of outcomes X is expressed as, 
)()()(
1 i
n
i i
xpxuXU ∑ ==           (4) 
Expected utility theory can also be applied as a CBA 
approach in risk regulation where public welfare is concerned. 
Consider a scenario of decision making under risk (disposal of 
nuclear waste, for example) where the risk is the possible 
realisation of environmental hazard. Suppose that the hazard 
may lead to a loss of wealth Nw Aw−  (measured by a 
monetary value), where Nw  denotes the original wealth and 
Aw  the reduced wealth if the hazard has occurred. In order to 
keep the risk within the acceptable range, an amount of money 
C is going to be invested. The objective of regulatory decision 
making is to find the optimal amount of investment that 
maximizes the public welfare. 
Let γ  denote the possibility (or risk) of the occurrence of 
an accident. We assume the existence of a state-independent 
utility function of the regulator )(wu  defined over payoffs, 
thus: 
=),( CU γ )( Cwu A −γ )()1( Cwu N −−+ γ    (5) 
Notice that ),( CU γ  represents the expected utility of the 
regulator over public wealth and that γ  is a function of C in the 
above equation. It has been proved in [11] that, when the decision 
maker is risk-neutral, the condition of optimal expenditure 
against risk is,  
)(1 AN ww −=′γ                (6) 
Under (6), the risk is reduced to the degree so that a further 
reduction needs much more expenditure and is therefore not 
economical. 
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Note that the optimal expenditure is independent of 
individual utility in (6). If the parameters of Nw , Aw  and )(Cγ  are from unique sources and thus remain the same 
among all the stakeholders, (6) holds for different risk-neutral 
decision makers. Arrow and Lind [12] have indicated that the 
decision maker should behave in a risk- neutral fashion when 
public welfare is concerned. Under the assumption of 
risk-neutral, it is possible for the decision to be unanimous 
within a group of stakeholders. However, if the stakeholders are 
not all risk-neutral or cost and benefit are not evenly shared, (6) 
will not hold. 
In the following section, we study an approach to deal with 
group decision making where risk and benefit may be unevenly 
shared and the decision makers may have their own utilities 
toward risk and uncertainty. 
III. GROUP DECISION-MAKING: A DECISION SUPPORT 
APPROACH 
In this section, we will establish a decision support model 
that considers multiple agents involved in group decision 
making under risk and uncertainty. Each agent has his/her 
cost-benefit estimation over a few alternatives. The objective of 
the model is to determine the group decision based on 
individual utilities and evidence support logic.  
Suppose that there are m  agents faced with n  alternatives 
},,,{ 21 nxxx "  and each agent has a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility or monetary cost-benefit 
estimation over all alternatives. Here, the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility is not necessarily the evaluation 
of his/her own payoff. When the issue of concern is about 
public welfare, it is the evaluation of public wealth. 
Let )( ji xU  denote agent i ’s expected utility of alternative 
jx  where },,1{ mi "=  and },,1{ nj "= . For each agent, 
we establish a set of beliefs, each of which denotes the 
comparison between two different alternatives. Let triple 
( ijk
i
jk
i
jk qup  , , ) denote the agent i ’s belief with respect to the 
hypothesis ‘Alternative jx  is preferred to alternative kx .’ 
where nkj ",1, =  and kj ≠ . For all n  alternatives, every 
agent has a complete set of beliefs that contains )1(
2
1 −nn  
items, each of which denotes a comparison between two 
different alternatives. For example, when n = 2, there is only 
one belief with respect to the hypothesis ‘Alternative 1x  is 
preferred to alternative 2x . When n = 3, each agent has three 
beliefs. 
Each agent assigns a set of uncertainty values jkq  to each 
belief, which denotes how much uncertainty the agent has about 
this belief. 
The relationship between individual beliefs and utilities of 
alternatives is expressed by, 
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Each agent is assigned a weight iw  range from 0 to 1 that 
denotes his/her power in the group decision. It acts as the 
sufficiency of belief in the process of aggregation of multiple 
beliefs. Then, multiple agents’ beliefs can be aggregated by 
means of (1) and (2). The aggregated beliefs denote the group 
preference over all alternatives. 
We give an example to illustrate how this approach is 
applied in the following section. 
IV. AN APPLICATION  
The livestock and poultry industry have to face the problem 
of disposing of diseased animal carcases. Today’s 
environmental legislation does not allow arbitrary disposal 
because of the possibility of pollution of water and the spread of 
disease. In the UK the Department of Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) are responsible for coordinating the 
disposal of diseased animal car cases. DEFRA collaborates with 
experts from a number of different parties (e.g. health 
departments and their agencies, veterinary officials, 
environment agencies, emergency planners and other 
professional partners) to inform their decisions regarding the 
most appropriate disposal option. 
In this case study, we consider a scenario where a number of 
poultry farms in a district still adopt the traditional on-farm 
approaches to bury or burn dead animals. This has led to public 
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concern of health and security. A regulatory committee is about 
to make decision on whether to pass a regulation to restrict these 
disposal methods.  
Five agents are involved in the decision making process: 
DEFRA (Agent 1), governmental officers (Agent 2), 
environmental experts (Agent 3), industrial representatives 
(Agent 4) and local resident representatives (Agent 5). Three 
alternatives are considered. 
z A1: Burial (status quo). 
z A2: Constructed disposal pit. 
z A3: Incineration. 
A1 is the current on-farm approach to disposing of dead 
animals. It may lead to a hazard to both other animals and 
human health. There is also a high potential for ground water 
contamination from both bacteria and nutrients. A2 reduces the 
risk of hazard to animal and human health when compared with 
A1. However, it still has the potential to contaminate 
underground water and it may be odorous. A3 is a viable 
alternative that reduces the risk of environmental hazard to the 
minimum. The disadvantage is its higher construction and 
maintenance costs. 
Each agent shows their payoffs (that might be the result of 
CBA or just individual evaluation). The payoffs of the agents in 
the form of either expected utilities or monetary values are 
shown in Table 1. 
TABLE Ⅰ Payoffs of the agents 
 A1 A2 A3 
Agent 1 0 50 100 
Agent 2 0 50 40 
Agent 3 -100 60 100 
Agent 4 0 £2,000 -£10,000 
Agent 5 -100 -80 100 
There are three hypothesises.  
1H : Alternative 1A  is prefered to 2A . 
2H : Alternative 1A  is prefered to 3A . 
3H : Alternative 2A  is prefered to 3A . 
With respect to these hypothesises, each agent i  has three 
beliefs ( iii qup 121212  , , ), (
iii qup 131313  , , ) and ( ,23
ip  , 23
iu  iq23 ). 
According to (7), the values of the beliefs are computed as 
shown in Table 2, 3, and 4. 
By assigning each agent a weight of 0.2, the aggregated 
belief can be computed by means of (1) and (2).  
TESLA is a decision support software based on information 
propagation methods [13]. It provides a graphical interface and 
evidence support logic algorithm. We use TESLA to deal with 
the computation and the graphical expression of multiple 
beliefs.  
 
 
 
Table Ⅱ Individual beliefs on H1 
Belief Values 
( 112
1
12
1
12 ,, qup ) (0.15, 0.2, 0.65) 
( 212
2
12
2
12 ,, qup ) (0, 0.3, 0.7) 
( 312
3
12
3
12 ,, qup ) (0, 0.2, 0.8) 
( 412
4
12
4
12 ,, qup ) (0.42, 0, 0.58) 
( 512
5
12
5
12 ,, qup ) (0.25, 0.4, 0.35) 
Table Ⅲ Individual beliefs on H2 
Belief Values 
( 123
1
23
1
23 ,, qup ) (0.15, 0.2, 0.65) 
( 223
2
23
2
23 ,, qup ) (0.5, 0.2, 0.3) 
( 323
3
23
3
23 ,, qup ) (0.3, 0.2, 0.5) 
( 423
4
23
4
23 ,, qup ) (1, 0, 0) 
( 523
5
23
5
23 ,, qup ) (0, 0.4, 0.6) 
TABLE Ⅳ Individual beliefs on H3 
Belief Values 
( 113
1
13
1
13 ,, qup ) (0, 0, 1) 
( 213
2
13
2
13 ,, qup ) (0, 0.3, 0.7) 
( 313
3
13
3
13 ,, qup ) (0, 0, 1) 
( 413
4
13
4
13 ,, qup ) (0.92, 0, 0.08) 
( 513
5
13
5
13 ,, qup ) (0, 0.4, 0.6) 
 
Figure Ⅰ TESLA’s interface.  
The aggregated beliefs are computed as, 
( AAA qup 121212 ,, ) = (0.16, 0.22, 0.62) 
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( AAA qup 232323 ,, ) = (0.39, 0.2, 0.41) 
( AAA qup 131313 ,, ) = (0.18, 0.14, 0.68) 
The aggregated beliefs show that both alternatives A2 and 
A3 are preferred to alternative A1, and alternatives A3 is 
slightly preferred to alternative A2.  
Figure Ⅱ, Ⅲ and Ⅳ show the ratio plots in which both 
individual beliefs and the aggregated beliefs are illustrated. The 
horizontal axis indicates the percentage uncertainty in the 
evidence and the vertical axis indicates the ratio of value for to 
value against. In Figure 2, all beliefs lie below the horizontal 
axis, which shows a consensus on ‘A2 is better than A1’. 
 
Figure Ⅱ Ratio plot with respect to 1H   
 
Figure Ⅲ Ratio plot with respect to 2H  
 
Figure Ⅳ Ratio plot with respect to 3H  
The weights assigned to the agents’ beliefs have a 
significant influence on the aggregated results. This may reflect 
the power structure of the group. The agent with more power to 
make the final decision will be assigned a higher weight. Under 
a democratic mechanism, the weights can be evenly distributed 
among the agents. On the other hand, the weights are 
concentrated to just a few in an autocratic system. When the 
uncertainty value is low for each agent, this decision support 
approach acts like a voting mechanism. 
Note that the scale of individual payoff or monetary values 
does not affect the group decision. Individual agents cannot 
manipulate the final decision by scaling up (or down) their 
payoffs. This ensures that each agent cannot influence the group 
decision more than their assigned weight. 
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have proposed a new decision support 
approach that can be used to make group decisions when risk, 
uncertainty, and conflicts of interest among stakeholders are 
involved. Based on evidence support logic and expected utility 
theory, this approach incorporates CBA within the framework 
of risk assessment. While this study makes a preliminary effort 
to link evidence support logic and economic analysis,  it should 
be remembered that it has been conducted using some 
assumptions, for example, individual utilities on public welfare 
and independency of individual beliefs. So far we deal with 
group decision making as a static process. However, it is 
actually a dynamic process where individual beliefs may change 
along with interactions among agents and uncertainty may be 
reduced because of new information. Intelligent agents can 
learn in this process and be adaptive to the dynamics. Future 
research will focus on the dynamics in group decision making. 
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